The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed a probate court’s rulings that a decedent’s children, who had been appointed his temporary co-guardians, had rebutted the presumption of undue influence attached to a will they benefited from and had an opportunity to influence, and that the will was validly executed and controlled the estate’s administration. In re Estate of Kachar, No. 374320 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2026).
In 2002, Brownie Kachar executed a will devising his real property to his three sons, Stanley, Daniel, and Nicholas, and the remainder of his estate to Stanley, Daniel, Nicholas, and his daughter, Karen. Stanley was named as the executor of the will. At the same time, Brownie appointed Stanley as his agent under his durable healthcare and financial powers of attorney.
In 2015, when Brownie was 88 years old, he suffered a traumatic brain injury in a car accident and became unable to live independently. In January 2016, neuropsychological screening indicated that he had difficulty remembering, understanding, and carrying out verbal instructions and was unable to formulate a plan for his care needs. The screenings included a recommendation to activate the healthcare power of attorney. Brownie spent time in a rehabilitation facility but returned home in April 2016, where he was cared for by in-home nurses. Shortly after returning home, Brownie became irritated that Stanley and his nurses were making decisions about his care without including him in the discussion. The situation escalated, and Brownie, feeling threatened by Stanley, picked up a barbecue fork to defend himself.
As a result of the April 2016 altercation, Brownie was evaluated by a doctor who indicated that Brownie could either return home under a nurse’s care or be admitted to a rehabilitation facility. Brownie, Daniel, and Karen indicated their desire for Brownie to return home, but Stanley and Brownie’s brother disagreed. Stanley filed an emergency petition for guardianship of Brownie to ensure that he had the authority to admit Brownie to a rehabilitation facility. Brownie was admitted to a facility despite his objection, and thereafter, the family relationships between Stanley, Daniel, and Karen deteriorated. Stanley stopped communicating with Brownie, Daniel, and Karen.
When Brownie’s attorney, Peter Fales, visited him at the rehabilitation facility shortly after he was admitted, Brownie expressed his strong desire to return home. In late May, Brownie appeared before the probate court and revoked his durable healthcare power of attorney. The probate court appointed someone other than Stanley to be Brownie’s unlimited guardian. The letters of guardianship noted that Brownie was legally incapacitated.
In June 2016, Fales scheduled an evaluation to establish Brownie’s competency for the guardianship proceeding. Fales forwarded related email communications to Daniel and Karen and informed them that, despite Fales’s warning that the probate court may not accept it due to the evaluations, Brownie wanted to change his will. The clinical psychologist who evaluated Brownie at Fales’s behest had determined that Brownie lacked the capacity to make informed decisions regarding his level of care and finances but indicated that he could make informed decisions about where he lived and whether to authorize or refuse medical treatment. Brownie’s guardian obtained his discharge from the rehabilitation facility on August 1, 2016, and the probate court changed his guardianship status from unlimited to temporary and appointed Daniel and Karen as co-guardians. The letters of guardianship provided Daniel and Karen with the limited authority to pay bills and make medical and placement decisions without identifying Brownie as legally incapacitated.
On the same day, Daniel dropped Brownie off at Fales’s office, where Brownie informed Fales that he wanted to execute a new will. Fales obtained an opinion from the clinical psychologist who had evaluated Brownie that Brownie had the capacity to execute a new will. Two days later, Brownie executed a new will devising his real estate and the remainder of his estate to Daniel and Karen and disinheriting Stanley and Nicholas. In addition, in late August, Brownie revoked the financial power of attorney naming Stanley as his agent after Fales obtained a clinical psychologist’s opinion that Brownie had the capacity to do so. Later that year, describing Brownie as an incapacitated person, Daniel and Karen petitioned the probate court to become his permanent co-guardians.
In August 2017, Brownie accused Daniel and Karen of not acting in his best interest and bullying him by not allowing him to drive. Karen eventually resigned as a co-guardian, and Daniel and Nicholas served as co-guardians until Brownie died in 2022.
Stanley filed a petition to probate the 2002 will, and Daniel and Karen filed a petition to probate the 2016 will. Stanley asserted that the 2016 will had been obtained by undue influence. The probate court found that a presumption of undue influence arose because of the factual circumstances of the case. However, the court denied Stanley’s motion for involuntary dismissal, concluding that there was sufficient rebuttal evidence for the case to proceed. Following a full trial, the court found that the 2016 will had been validly executed, was not the product of undue influence, and would control the administration of the estate. Stanley appealed both rulings.
The Michigan Court of Appeals noted that, under Michigan law, a presumption of undue influence applies to a transaction when (1) a fiduciary relationship exists between the grantor and a fiduciary; (2) the transaction benefits the fiduciary; and (3) the fiduciary had an opportunity to influence the grantor’s decision. Further, the court found that Daniel and Karen, as Brownie’s co-guardians, were his fiduciaries, both under Michigan statute and because Brownie had placed complete trust in them, and that they had the power to control the subject matter at issue. Thus, there was a mandatory inference of undue influence, and the burden shifted to them to provide contrary evidence rebutting the presumption, although the burden of persuasion regarding undue influence remained with Stanley. The court found no clear error in the probate court’s denial of Stanley’s motion for involuntary dismissal, which addressed only whether sufficient rebuttal evidence existed to let the case proceed to trial, not the merits of the case.
In considering the probate court’s final order, the court held that the probate court had not clearly erred in finding that the presumption of undue influence had been rebutted. The court noted that undue influence destroys the testator’s free agency but found that the evidence supported the probate court’s conclusion that Brownie had not been subject to undue influence and had made his own decision to execute the 2016 will, so the will was valid. The court emphasized that Brownie had twice independently sought out his attorney without Daniel and Karen, that the clinical psychologist had confirmed Brownie’s testamentary capacity days before the will’s execution, and that Daniel and Karen had not been present when the will was signed and had never reviewed its contents before its execution. The court acknowledged evidence that Brownie was, at times, delusional, isolated, and volatile following his brain injury, but it concluded that this did not undermine the probate court’s finding that his decision to disinherit Stanley reflected specific, independently formed grievances and was not the product of coercion. The court also rejected Stanley’s contention that Fales’s coordination with Daniel and Karen on scheduling and logistics established a disqualifying conflict of interest, finding that the probate court had not clearly erred in finding that Fales represented Brownie alone.
Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed both the probate court’s denial of involuntary dismissal and its final order admitting the 2016 will to probate.
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